SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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LABOR LAW-PUBLIC

EMPLOYEES-PUBLIC

SCHOOL

TEACHERS

Do NOT HAVE RIGHT TO STRIKE BUT COURT MAY NOT IMPOSE
SANCTIONS WITHOUT FORMAL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS-Pas-

saic Township Bd. of Educ. v. Passaic Township Educ. Ass 'n, 222
N.J. Super. 298, 536 A.2d 1276 (App. Div. 1987).
On October 10, 1985, during negotiations between the Passaic Township Board of Education (Board) and the Passaic
Township Education Association (Association) regarding terms
of employment, the Association went on strike in order to
strengthen its bargaining position. 222 N.J. Super. at 299-300,
536 A.2d at 1276. That same day, acting on the Board's complaint, the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, issued
a temporary restraining order against any form of work stoppage
by the Association. Id. at 300, 536 A.2d at 1276-77. The court
ordered the employees to return to work the next day. Id., 536
A.2d at 1277. Association members defied the order by failing to
report to work on the following two work days.
Although the Board was able to keep schools open by the
use of substitute personnel, it applied for a second restraining
order on October 15, 1985. In the second order, the trial judge
prohibited the continuation of the Association's strike, and ordered that employees who failed to return to work on October
16, 1985, would be fined five-hundred dollars, plus two days
gross pay for every work day absence thereafter. Again, the employees refused to comply with the court order. On October 17,
1985, the Association and the Board reached a contract agreement, and employees returned to work the following Monday.
Id. at 300 01, 536 A.2d at 1277.
In January 1986, the lower court rejected the Association's
request to be relieved from paying the monetary sanctions, and
instructed the Board to submit a list of itemized expenditures relating to the work stoppage and the resulting litigation. Id. at
301, 536 A.2d at 1277. The court subsequently entered a final
order imposing monetary sanctions totaling $54,051.29, which
reflected both the Board's strike-related expenses and the per
diem fines against individual employees. Id. The Association appealed the trial court's decision. Id. The appellate division held
that public school employees do not have the right to strike, but
the imposition of fines without a formal contempt proceeding
violated the New Jersey Court Rules. Id. at 303, 306, 536 A.2d
1278, 1280.
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Judge O'Brien, writing for the court, rejected the Association's assertion that public employees have the right to strike, unless there is a clear showing that a work stoppage would create a
grave and immediate threat to the public welfare. Id. at 301-303,
536 A.2d at 1277-78. The judge noted that the New Jersey
Supreme Court had previously considered this issue. Id. at 302,
536 A.2d at 1277 (citing Union Beach Bd. of Educ. v. New Jersey
Educ. Ass n, 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 867 (1968)). He stated that the
supreme court, while observing that the New Jersey Constitution
gives public workers the right to organize, and that nothing prohibits the state legislature from permitting public workers to
strike, had held that the Legislature's enactment of the New
Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:13A-1, did not reflect a legislative intent to permit strikes by
public employees. Id., 536 A.2d at 1277-78 (citing Union Beach
Bd. of Educ. v. NewJersey Educ. Ass'n, 53 N.J. 29, 46, 48, 247 A.2d
867, 876, 877 (1968)).
Following the Union Beach rationale, the appellate division
concluded that recent state laws mandating compulsory arbitration in contract disputes involving policemen and firemen, did
not reflect a legislative intent to permit public teachers to strike.
Id. at 302-03, 536 A.2d at 1278. Moreover, Judge O'Brien asserted that case law from foreign jurisdictions allowing public
workers to strike in limited circumstances did not compel the appellate division to change New Jersey's law. Id. The court asserted that such a radical change could be accomplished only by
the state legislature or the supreme court. Id. Accordingly, the
court determined that the restraining orders issued by the trial
court were proper since public workers do not have a right to
strike. Id.
The court next considered the sanctions imposed for violating the restraining orders. Id. at 304, 536 A.2d at 1279. The
court rejected the assertion that the strike was legal because strikers had offered to make up lost time and because the Board had
successfully obtained substitute teachers. Id. at 303-04, 536 A.2d
at 1278. Judge O'Brien asserted that the teachers had violated
court orders and therefore could be held in contempt pursuant
to New Jersey Court Rule 1:10-2. Id. at 304, 536 A.2d at 1278
(citing N.J. CT. R. 1:10-2).
Judge O'Brien noted that prosecution for contempt under
New Jersey Court Rule 1:10-2 must conform to specifically enumerated procedures. Id. The court observed, however, that the
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proceedings which resulted in the trial court's final judgment
were not conducted in accordance with the procedural requirements of Rule 1:10-2 and Rule 1:10-4. Id. Instead, the judge
noted, the lower court acted under Rule 1:10-5, which only permitted the court to order reimbursement of the Board's strikerelated expenses. Id. The court recognized that the trial court
was not precluded by statute from imposing the large fines. Id. at
305, 536 A.2d at 1279. The appellate court stated that the trial
court was estopped, however, from imposing fines in the case at
bar, because of the procedural deficiencies. Id. The fines were
vacated by the appellate division and the matter remanded for a
recalculation of Board expenses. Id. at 306, 536 A.2d at 1280.
The appellate court in Passaic Township Board of Education
properly exercised judicial restraint in respecting the New Jersey
common law that public employees, including teachers, may not
strike. The New Jersey Constitution grants public employees the
right to organize, and teachers' unions are a product of that
right. These bargaining units may seek a change in the current
law through the legislative process, or patiently wait for a
favorable ruling from the state supreme court. Until then, taxpayers should not be expected to bear the financial burden of a
work stoppage. However, by vacating the fines instead of remanding for properly conducted contempt proceedings, the
court threatened the integrity of court orders. Moreover, it established poor precedent in that a court's procedural error in a
contempt proceeding may bar it from remedying such errors and
exacting the appropriate penalties in subsequent proceedings.
Christopher Leporati
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CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT

TO GRAND JURY INDICTMENT-GRAND
JURORS ARE OBLIGATED TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF ALL RELEVANT EVIDENCE TO LEGITIMATELY VOTE ON PROPOSED IN-

DICTMENT-State v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 222 NJ. Super. 343, 536
A.2d 1299 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 111 NJ. 574, 546 A.2d
502 (1988).
On October 24, 1985, a thirty-five count indictment was returned against various defendants in connection with an allegedly unlawful disposal of hazardous wastes. 222 N.J. Super. at
346, 536 A.2d at 1300. The indictment followed six months of
testimony regarding the defendants' activities presented to
twenty-three grand jurors. Id. at 347, 536 A.2d at 1300. Ultimately, however, only seventeen grand jurors voted, as six jurors
had been "absent" the final few months of testimony. Id. 536
A.2d at 1301.
During the indictment process, the grand jury had been repeatedly informed that they would vote on the matter on October 24, 1985. The Assistant Attorney General had explained that
any juror who missed a session must become qualified to vote by
reviewing the transcripts of the days missed, as well as transcripts
of supplemental testimony which was presented to a substitute
grand jury. Id. at 347-48, 536 A.2d at 1301. To this end, transcripts of the sessions were distributed for the jurors' review the
morning of October 24, 1985. Id. at 348, 536 A.2d at 1301.
Although some jurors had to review several thousand pages of
transcript, within a few hours, the foreman informed the court
that the reading had been completed and that the jury was prepared to vote. Id. at 348, 355 n.3, 536 A.2d at 1301, 1305 n.3.
Following its "deliberation," the grand jury returned the entire
thirty-five count indictment. Id. at 348, 536 A.2d at 1301.
Before trial, the defendants successfully motioned to dismiss
the indictment primarily because fewer than the requisite twelve
jurors had been sufficiently informed of the evidence on which
the indictment was based. Id. at 346, 536 A.2d at 1300. The defense asserted that the voting jurors had not adequately reviewed
the transcripts of the sessions they had missed. Id. at 349, 536
A.2d at 1301-02. The trial court determined that due to the limited time allotted for the jurors to review the transcripts, as well
as the Assistant Attorney General's ambiguous instructions with
respect to the jurors' responsibilities in that regard, there were
not twelve jurors who were qualified to vote on the indictment.
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Id. at 348-50, 536 A.2d at 1301-02. Thus, the judge dismissed
the entire indictment. Id. at 350, 536 A.2d at 1302.
On appeal, the state urged that the dismissal was improper
because it had complied with the supreme court's guidelines for
redressing instances of absenteeism by grand jurors. Id. (citing
State v. Del Fino, 100 N.J. 154, 495 A.2d 60 (1985)). The state
maintained that the grand jurors, who were "experts" in the matter, were capable of reviewing the material in a short period of
time by skimming over unnecessary or cumulative testimony. Id.
at 352, 536 A.2d at 1303. Moreover, the state asserted that further inquiry into the matter was improperly delving into the
mental processes of the jurors. Id. (citing N.J. R. EvID. 41).
The appellate division rejected the state's arguments as unpersuasive and illogical. Id. at 352, 536 A.2d at 1303. Writing
for the court, Judge Scalera initially noted that the state constitutional guarantee of indictment by at least twelve grand jurors is
an essential protection afforded citizens against wrongful or oppressive prosecutorial action. Id. at 351, 536 A.2d at 1303 (citing
N.J. CONST. art I, para. 8). He asserted that the grand jurors
"must be 'informed' of all the evidence before each may legitimately vote." Id. at 353-54, 536 A.2d at 1304 (citing State v. Del
Fino, 100 N.J. 154, 495 A.2d 60 (1985)). Thejudge posited that
once an indictment has been returned by a grand jury, a rebuttable presumption of validity attaches to it. Id. at 351-52, 536 A.2d
at 1303.
The appellate division observed that reading transcripts is a
permissible method for jurors to inform themselves. Id. at 35354, 536 A.2d at 1304 (quoting State v. Del Fino, 100 N.J. 154, 164,
495 A.2d 60, 65 (1985)). It determined that in the case at bar the
presumption of validity had been rebutted because the record
demonstrated that the grand jury ignored its responsibility to adequately review missed testimonial sessions. Id. at 354, 536 A.2d
at 1304. The court asserted that the record supported "the trial
court's conclusion that not every voting juror had sufficient time
in which to adequately review the transcripts and exhibits even to
the extent necessary to determine which to scrutinize more
closely and which to skim." Id. at 355, 536 A.2d at 1305. It concluded that these findings did not require improper consideration of the jurors' thought processes. Id.
Finally, the court asserted that rebuttal of the presumption
of validity was not dispositive of the matter and did not warrant
dismissal of every count in the indictment. Id. The court posited
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that the defense must still "show a nexus between the evidence
that was overlooked or not properly presented and specific
counts of the indictment." Id. As such, it remanded the matter
to the trial court with instructions to evaluate the impact of the
evidence that was not properly considered as it related to each
count in the indictment in light of the mandates of the grand jury
process. Id. at 356, 536 A.2d at 1305. The court observed that
should the defendants fail to show such a nexus to the individual
counts in the indictment, those counts should not be dismissed.
Id. at 355, 536 A.2d at 1305.
The Ciba-Geigy opinion clarifies the blurry line between the
need for procedural flexibility at the indictment stage of the criminal process and the need to meet the constitutional requirement
of charges founded upon probable cause. Unfortunately, the
opinion failed to articulate bright-line standards to guide courts
faced with attacks upon indictments in cases which are not so
clear. The court failed to indicate how much time should be allocated for the grand jury to sufficiently inform itself of missed testimonial sessions, or provide a means of ensuring that the grand
jury has faithfully reviewed the transcripts provided. Nonetheless, the opinion stands as a warning to prosecutors that mere lip
service to the requirement of an "informed grand jury" will not
suffice. Grand jurors must be actually informed and indictments
will be dismissed where the prosecutor, or jurors themselves, fail
to fulfill their constitutional obligations.
Sarah McCandless

EVIDENCE-NESPERSON'S

PRIVILEGE-NEWSPERSON

CANNOT

BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY ABOUT INFORMATION DISCLOSED
IN COURSE OF

WAIVER-In re

His

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES ON THEORY OF

Schumnan, 114 N.J. 14, 552 A.2d 602 (1989).

GaryJ. Mayron was arrested in 1986 for the kidnapping and
murder of Susan Brennan. 114 N.J. at 16, 552 A.2d at 603. The
New Jersey, Herald published two articles authored by Evan Schuman containing admissions by Mayron regarding the circumstances of the crime and the method of its commission. Id. at 1617, 552 A.2d at 603. The first article stated that in an interview,
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Mayron had admitted killing Brennan. A second article, published two days later, contained incriminating statements by
Mayron as to why he kidnapped and murdered Brennan. Id. at
17, 552 A.2d at 603.
The state subpoenaed Schuman to testify before a grand jury
and at a pretrial suppression hearing on the articles. Id. at 16
n.1, 552 A.2d 603 n.1. The journalist, however, asserted the
newsperson's privilege, and the state withdrew the subpoenas
without prejudice. Thereafter, the state subpoenaed Schuman to
testify at trial. Id. at 16, 552 A.2d at 603. Schuman sought to
quash the subpoena, again asserting the newsperson's privilege.
Id. at 17, 552 A.2d at 603-04.
The trial judge, relying on Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89
N.J. 176, 187, 445 A.2d 376, 382 (1982), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 907
(1982), held that the NewJersey Shield Law provides for an absolute privilege against disclosure. Schuman, 114 N.J. at 19, 552
A.2d at 604 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1988)). The court, while noting it was not sure that the
information was confidential, nevertheless decided "to err on the
side of caution," and quashed the subpoena. Id., 552 A.2d at
604-05. The appellate division granted leave to appeal nunc pro
tunc, and reversed the trial judge's determination, holding that a
newsperson may be subpoenaed and questioned about information, its source and the circumstances under which it was obtained when such information already has been disclosed. Id.,
552 A.2d at 605. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted leave
to appeal. Id. at 20, 552 A.2d at 605.
The supreme court reversed the appellate division in.a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Garibaldi. Id. at 32, 552 A.2d
at 611. On. the theory of waiver, the court held that a newsperson cannot be forced to testify about information disclosed in the
course of his professional activities, including his source and the
circumstances under which the information was obtained. Id. at
20, 552 A.2d at 605.
The supreme court noted that the Shield Law was enacted in
1933 to protect the confidential sources of media when their information was published. Id. at 20-21, 552 A.2d at 605-06. The
court observed that the Shield Law was amended in 1960 to expand the scope of the protection of media sources. Id. at 21, 552
at 606. The court stated that the information itself and sources
of unpublished information, however, remained unprotected. Id.
Additionally, the court recognized that the 1960 amendments
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subjected protected sources to newly enacted waiver provisions.
Id. It added that the Shield Law was amended again in 1977, in
response to judicial interpretations, to protect all sources and all
information obtained in the newsgathering process, without regard to dissemination. Id. at 22, 522 at 606. The Shield Law was
amended a third time in 1979, the justice observed, to incorporate New Jersey case law allowing criminal defendants to obtain
exculpatory evidence from newspersons. Id. at 23-24, 552 A.2d
at 607 (citing In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978)). Justice Garibaldi reasoned that the
foregoing continuous legislative efforts to protect the media
from the compulsory process, even where the information has
been disclosed in an article, dictated that Schuman not be forced
to testify. Id. at 20-21, 552 A.2d at 605.
The court stressed that the New Jersey Legislature has consistently acted to prevent the state from impeding media activities. Id. at 24, 552 A.2d at 607. It noted that unlike its federal
counterpart, the New Jersey Wiretap Act requires the state to
demonstrate "special need" to tap a newsperson's telephone. Id.
Moreover, it recognized that the Legislature has narrowed the
circumstances under which the police can search and seize data
obtained in the process of newsgathering activities. Id.
The supreme court rejected the state's assertion that Rule 27
of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence (Rule) 27, establishing a
newspersons' privilege "to refuse to disclose . . . any news or
information obtained in the course of pursuing his professional
activities whether or not it is disseminated," and Rule 37, providing that a privileged disclosure is not a wavier of the privilege,
were in conflict, and therefore should be interpreted to require
that the newsperson's privilege was waived when information was
disseminated. The court asserted that both the plain language
and legislative history of Rule 27 were not in conflict and expressly required that Schuman not be forced to testify. Id. at 2526, 552 A.2d at 607-08. The court stated that assuming that
these rules of evidence were inconsistent, Rule 27(b) would supersede the waiver provisions of Rule 37 because it was enacted
after Rule 37. Id., 552 A.2d at 608. The court further noted that
the state's interpretation was flawed because it rendered the
phrase "whether or not it is disseminated" in Rule 27 meaningless and because Rule 37 only applies to criminal defendants. Id.
at 26-27, 552 A.2d at 608-09. Therefore, the court held that
although a newsperson would waive the privilege pursuant to
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Rule 37 by disclosing protected information to people outside
the scope of his professional activities, it could not be waived by
dissemination in his professional activities. Id.
The court concluded that policy considerations also favored
quashing the subpoena. Id. at 28, 552 A.2d at 609. It noted that
the information the state sought was available from other
sources. Id. at 28-29, 552 A.2d at 609. It also determined that
the public perception that the media is an "arm of the prosecution" might inhibit the flow of information to the public as potential sources would be hesitant to provide information if confidentiality could not be guaranteed, newspersons might destroy
sensitive files, and reporters would fear that disclosure of information might constitute a waiver. Id. at 29, 552 at 610. Likewise,
the court asserted that embroiling a small newspaper in protracted litigation over this issue could hinder its newsgathering
activities. Id. The court stressed that these concerns were no less
persuasive when the information is not confidential because it
has already been disseminated. Id. at 30-31, 552 A.2d at 610-11.
Finally, Justice Garibaldi posited that the considerations underlying the decision to compel newspersons' testimony in grand
jury proceedings support the conclusion that Schuman cannot be
forced to testify at Mayron's trial. Id. at 31, 552 A.2d at 611.
Unlike the secrecy surrounding the grand jury process, a criminal
trial is public. Id. at 31-32, 552 A.2d at 611. Moreover, the court
observed that the newsperson would be subject to probing crossexamination to elicit more specific information. Id.
The Schuman decision serves to reinforce the protections of
the Shield Law. While such a determination at first glance may
appear to hinder prosecutorial efforts, the unrestrained flow of
information is important to law enforcement, as it often provides
the authorities with crucial leads in difficult cases. Moreover, as
the facts of this case highlight, rarely will a newsperson be the
sole source of incriminating evidence against a particular criminal defendant. Finally, a contrary judicial result would have rendered useless the protection the Legislature sought to afford the
media by enacting the Shield Law.
Loryn P. Riggiola
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-FIFTH AMENDMENT-FOR MIRANDA
PURPOSES, DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES
CASEWORKER

DEEMED

LAW

ENFORCEMENT

OFFICER

WHEN

CONDUCTING CUSTODIAL INTERVIEW-State v. Helewa, 223 N.J.

Super. 40, 537 A.2d 1328 (App. Div. 1988).
On October 8, 1985, several Old Bridge Township police arrested George Helewa for sexually assaulting his two teenage
daughters. 228 N.J. Super. at 42, 537 A.2d at 1329. At the police
station, where Helewa remained for several hours before being
transferred to a correctional facility, he was informed of his rights
and later he signed a Miranda warning card. Helewa did not invoke his right to counsel, nor was he questioned by the police.
The next day, a caseworker from the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) interviewed Helewa for over an hour at the
correctional facility where he was confined, regarding the allegations of sexual assault. The DYFS worker, aware that Helewa had
been read his Miranda rights, did not readvise him of these rights.
Id. at 43, 537 A.2d at 1329. She did, however, tell him that his
statement would be reported to the prosecutor's office.
Although initially hesitant, Helewa agreed to speak to the
caseworker because he claimed he had "nothing to lose."
Helewa was indicted in April 1986, for two counts of child
endangerment and aggravated sexual assault. Id., 537 A.2d at
1330 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4(a) (West 1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C: 14-2(a) (West 1979)). Helewa pleaded not guilty and
challenged the admissibility of his statement to the DYFS worker
on the grounds that he was not advised of his Miranda rights
prior to the interview. Id. at 43-44, 537 A.2d at 1330. The trial
court denied Helewa's motion, reasoning that the DYFS
caseworker was not a law enforcement official for purposes of Miranda, and that the defendant was aware of his rights when he
voluntarily waived them. Id. at 44, 537 A.2d at 1330. The appellate division granted leave to appeal and affirmed. The court
held that a DYFS worker was a law enforcement agent for Miranda purposes, but asserted that the defendant had knowingly
waived his Miranda rights. Id. at 52-53, 537 A.2d at 1334-35.
The court also asserted that Miranda warnings need not be repeated at each custodial interview. Id. at 52, 537 A.2d at 1335.
Judge Michels, writing for the panel, began his analysis by
observing that under certain circumstances a person is considered to be a law enforcement official for Miranda purposes when
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conducting a custodial interview. Id. at 45-50, 537 A.2d at 133033. The judge noted that the critical inquiry is not whether the
interview was conducted at the direction of law enforcement officials, but whether the custodial interview "is likely to lead to a
criminal prosecution." Id. at 51, 537 A.2d at 1334. The court
concluded that if such questioning leads to subsequent prosecution and Miranda warnings were not given, the state will be
barred from using the defendant's statement in its case-in-chief.
See id. at 45, 50-51, 537 A.2d at 1330, 1333-34.
The appellate division held that due to the "close working
relationship" between DYFS and the prosecutor's office, a caseworker conducting a custodial interrogation must be considered
a law enforcement official for Miranda purposes. Id. at 51-52, 537
A.2d at 1334. The judge noted the "close working relationship"
between law enforcement agencies and DYFS in child abuse
cases. Id. at 47-48, 537 A.2d at 1332. He also noted that
"[a]lthough the DYFS caseworker's ultimate purpose in obtaining information from the alleged perpetrator is to ensure the
protection and welfare of the child, the likelihood of such information being used against the perpetrator in a criminal prosecution changes the status of the 'social worker' to one of a 'law
enforcement officer' in the context of Miranda." Id. at 48, 537
A.2d at 1332.
The court next addressed the necessity of repeating Miranda
warnings at subsequent custodial interviews. See id. at 52-53, 537
A.2d at 1334-35. The court recognized the importance of protecting the fifth amendment rights of criminal defendants, but
stated that Miranda requirements need only be complied with at
the commencement of questioning. Id. at 52, 537 A.2d at 1335
(quoting State v. A'Iagee, 52 N.J. 352, 374, 245 A.2d 339, 350
(1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1097 (1969)). The court reasoned.
that while "the DYFS interview may constitute a different species
of custodial interrogation than that conducted by a traditional
law enforcement officer, . . . [it did not require] additional warnings where the police would not be under a concomitant duty."
Id. at 52-53, 537 A.2d at 1335. Accordingly, the court determined that Helewa was properly advised of his rights and knowingly waived them. Id. at 52, 537 A.2d at 1334.
Judge Shebell, in a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in result, agreed with the majority's conclusion that
because of the relationship between law enforcement agencies
and DYFS, Miranda warnings are required prior to a DYFS
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worker's custodial interrogation if the resulting statements are to
be admissible in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 53-54, 537 A.2d at
1335 (Shebell,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
judge noted, however, that the purpose of the Miranda doctrine is
to afford a defendant "the full opportunity to exercise his rights
and ... to combat the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation." Id. at 54, 537 A.2d at 1335-36 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)) (Shebell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in result). Therefore, Judge
Shebell concluded that in order to protect an individual's fifth
amendment and other related rights, the repetition of Miranda
warnings by a DYFS worker should be required. Id. at 55, 537
A.2d at 1336 (Shebell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
result).
The Helewa court acknowledged that social workers are regarded as law enforcement officers when conducting custodial interviews and as such they trigger the mandatory safeguards of
M'iranda. The court, while recognizing the critical need to protect the constitutional rights of defendants, failed to require that
additional Miranda warnings be given prior to such interviews.
This decision indicates the court's unwillingness to impose seemingly unnecessary administrative burdens on state agents, so long
as defendants have been previously advised of their rights. The
court's reluctance in this regard may result in effectively eliminating the protection afforded by Miranda to those defendants who
are unaware of the possible repercussions of their statements to
state agents in subsequent interrogations.
Susan 1'ortmann
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AND BATrERY-JURY INSTRUCTION ON ASSAULT

AND BATTERY IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE IS ONLY APPROPRIATE

IF PHYSICIAN

DIFFERENT

FROM

PERFORMS

THAT

OPERATION

AUTHORIZED

BY

SIGNIFICANTLY
THE

PATIENT-

Samoilov v. Raz, 222 N.J. Super. 108, 536 A.2d 275 (App. Div.
1987).
In 1983, Dr. Sharir Raz surgically removed a benign tumor
located beneath the left ear of Sergey Samoilov. See 222 N.J.
Super. at 110-12, 536 A.2d at 276-77. The left side of Samoilov's
face is now paralyzed as a result of facial nerve damage sustained
during the surgery. Id. at 112, 536 A.2d at 277. Samoilov
brought a malpractice suit against Raz to recover damages. Id. at
109, 536 A.2d at 275.
At trial, Samoilov and Raz offered conflicting testimony concerning their discussions regarding the possible risks attendant
to the surgery. Id. at 110, 536 A.2d at 276. Samoilov claimed
that Raz had told him serious damage to the facial nerve was not
likely if the tumor was benign. See id. Raz, however, asserted that
he had emphasized the possibility of facial nerve damage, regardless of whether the tumor was malignant or benign. Id. at 111,
536 A.2d at 276. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on
assault and battery, and instead instructed the jury on traditional
principles of negligence. Id. at 112, 536 A.2d at 277. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Id. at 113, 536 A.2d
at 277. The plaintiff appealed alleging, among other things, that
the trial judge erred in failing to charge the jury on the theory of
assault and battery. Id. at 109, 113, 536 A.2d at 275, 277.
The appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision. Id.
at 121, 536 A.2d at 282. Judge Baime, writing for the court,
noted the common law rule that deviation in a surgical procedure, however slight, without first having obtained a patient's
consent, constitutes a battery. Id. at 116, 536 A.2d at 279 (citing
Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 360-61, 90 S.E.2d 754, 758
(1956)). The court explained, however, that as the use of anesthesia in modern surgery makes it impossible for patients to consent to changes due to unforeseen complications during an
operation, strict adherence to the common law rule is no longer
appropriate. Id. at 116-18, 536 A.2d at 279-80. Instead, the
court adopted the "prevailing view" that when deviation from
the contemplated surgical procedure is necessitated because of
unexpected complications, a physician's conduct should be
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judged according to the negligence theory of informed consent.
Id. at 118-19, 536 A.2d at 280-8 1. The court further determined
that jury instruction on battery should be limited to instances
where a patient consents to a surgical procedure and the physician performs a "substantially different" procedure without the
patient's authorization. Id. at 119, 536 A.2d at 280-81.
The appellate division noted that for policy reasons "absent
proof to the contrary, the consent given, express or implied,
should be construed to authorize the physician to employ surgical procedures, which in his professional judgment, are reasonably necessary to remedy his patient's condition." Id. at 120, 536
A.2d at 281. Applying this standard, the court posited that there
was no basis for a jury charge on assault and battery. Id. The
court concluded that the jury instruction was proper, dismissed
the plaintiff's other claims as to the necessity of a limited instruction regarding the consent form's probative effect, and held that
the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence as being
without merit. Id. at 121, 536 A.2d at 281-82.
The Samoilov court determined that a jury instruction regarding battery is proper in a medical malpractice action only when
the evidence indicates that a physician has performed an operation significantly different from the one consented to by a plaintiff. Absent such evidence, a physician's conduct will be
measured against the traditional negligence standard. The
court's decision permits liability based on the theory of battery to
attach only in very limited circumstances. The court should be
commended for properly restricting the applicability of a theory,
based on outdated principles, to only egregious situations.
Jean-M1arc Zimmerman

